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STATE OF UTAH

January 16, 1990

JAN1 1310
Ctork, Sujuwi* Court, Utah

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

State v. Patrick P. Coando

fflM/f

Dear Mr. Butler:
The respondent, State of Utah, hereby waives the right
to file a Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
in the above-referenced case pursuant to Rule 47(d), Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court. This waiver does not constitute a
stipulation that the petition should be granted, but rather, it
is respondent's position that the petition should be denied based
upon the legal analysis contained in the Brief of Respondent and
the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which are attached to
this letter. In the event that the Court deems an additional
response by the State necessary to its determination, a Brief in
Opposition will be provided.
Thank you for your consideration.
Very truly yours,

SANDRA L. (^S^mEW
Assistant Attorney General
SLS:bks
cc:

Dixon Hindley
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

State of Utah,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 880546-CA

v,
Patrick Dean Coando,
Defendant and Appellant,

FILED
DEC 1 51989
_ ^ _ _ . , o ( r * Court

Eighth District, Duchesne County
ohc#un + *rpm*
The Honorable Dennis L. Draney
Attorneys:
Dixon D. Hindley, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren, Salt Lake
City, for Respondent
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Croft I 1
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant Patrick Dean Coando appeals his conviction of
issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (Supp. 1989). Defendant urges reversal of
his conviction, claiming that the State lacks jurisdiction. We
affirm.
On October 26, 1987, defendant was charged in Roosevelt,
Duchesne County, Utah, with the crime of issuing bad checks. The
bad checks which defendant was .charged included a check for $165
to Safeway, checks for $29.26 and $20 to Tri-Mart, checks for $50
and $20 to Triangle Oil, and checks for $50 and $20 to Vernal
Drug, for a total of $354.26. Safeway, Tri-Mart, and Triangle
Oil are in Roosevelt. Vernal Drug and the Vernal branch of First
Interstate Bank of Utah (First Interstate), the drawee of each
bad check, are in Vernal, Uintah County.
1. Bryant H. Croft, Senior District Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.
1989).

Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and entered into an
abeyance agreement, which required him to make restitution
payments and refrain from similar legal violations. On April 25,
1988, the district court in Duchesne County, having found that
defendant had violated the abeyance agreement, set aside the plea
in abeyance and entered judgment on the guilty plea. Defendant
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction at an order to show
cause hearing, on grounds that he was an enrolled tribal member
of the Uintah and Wind River Reservations and that the offenses
were committed on the Uintah-Ouray Reservations. The court
denied defendant's motion, finding that he was not an enrolled
member of the Uintah and Ouray Reservations and that all the
checks issued by defendant were drawn on First Interstate Bank of
Utah, Vernal branch, which is not within an Indian reservation.
On appeal, defendant claims that the State lacks
jurisdiction because he is an Indian and all but two of the bad
checks were passed in Roosevelt, which is in Indian country and
not subject to state jurisdiction. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State
of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1188 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983), reh'g 773 F.2d
1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986).
Defendant concedes that the State has jurisdiction to prosecute
for the two checks totaling $70 written to Vernal Drug, in Uintah
County. He contends, as a result, that the State may charge him
with a class B misdemeanor only, and not a third degree felony
because the amount involved is less than $200. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-505(3)(a) (Supp. 1989).
The State argues that notwithstanding the Ute Indian Tribe
decision, Roosevelt is not in Indian country and further, that
defendant did not sufficiently establish his membership in an
Indian tribe. In addition, the State argues that payment by the
drawee bank is an essential element of the bad check offense thus
giving the State jurisdiction over all offenses involving checks
drawn on banks located within the state and undisputedly not
within Indian country. We address this second argument first,
and find it dispositive.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
The State argues that First Interstate's refusing payment of
the checks defendant issued is an essential element of the bad
check offense and because the refusal occurred outside Indian
country, the State may assert proper jurisdiction over all the
bad check charges arising from checks drawn on First Interstate.
We agree. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1978) states in pertinent
part:

(1) A person is subject to prosecution
in this state for an offense which he
commits, while either within or outside
the state, by his own conduct or that of
another for which he is legally
accountable, if:
(a) the offense is committed either
wholly or partly within the state;

(2) An offense is committed partly
within this state if either the conduct
which is an element of the offense, or the
result which is such an element, occurs
within this state.
Under section 76-1-201, if conduct or a result of conduct
constituting any element of the offense occurs within the state,
the State has jurisdiction to prosecute the offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (Supp. 1989) defines the
elements of the crime of issuing a bad check or draft as follows:
Any person who issues or passes a check
or draft for the payment of money, for the
purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any
money, property, or other thing of value
or paying for any services, wages, salary,
labor, or rent, knowing it will not be
paid by the drawee and payment is refused
bv the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad
check or draft.
(Emphasis added.)2
2. Prior to enactment of section 76-6-505 in 1973, passing
checks without sufficient funds was governed by Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-20-11 (1953). Under section 76-20-11, refusal of payment
was not an element of the crime, but instead served only as
admissible proof of presentment and presumptive evidence of
insufficiency of funds.

When construing statutory language, we assume that all words
and terms are used advisedly and interpret terms in accordance
with their commonly accepted meaning. Pate v. Marathon Stegl
QQ_U, 111 P.2d 428. 430 (Utah 1989); Hector Inc. v. United Sav^_&
Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542. 546 (Utah 1987); Grant v. Utah State
Land Bd.. 26 Utah 2d 100. 485 P.2d 1035. 1036 (1971); Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660. 672 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). The language of section 76-6-505 unambiguously provides
that the drawee's refusal to pay is an essential element of the
offense since the provision is written in the conjunctive and
requires refusal of payment for the offense to be complete. The
Colorado Supreme Court considered similar language in Colorado's
former bad check statute and found that refusal to pay was an
element of the crime. People v. Ouinn, 190 Colo. 534. 549 P.2d
1332, 1334-35 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).3 See also State v.
Green, 672 P.2d 400. 403 (Utah 1983) (Hall. C.J.. dissenting)
(the essential elements of the bad check offense include refusal
of payment by the drawee). If the drawee bank does not refuse to
pay. the crime has not been committed. See Riogs v. State, 34
Md. App. 324. 367 A.2d 22. 26 (1976) (relying on the principle
that every element of a crime must be proved, the court reversed
judgment where the State did not establish that the statutorily
required element that the same check which defendant used to
obtain money be dishonored upon presentment).
Defendant argues that refusal by the drawee to pay is merely
a condition confirming
that the offender had the requisite
culpable intent4 or knovrledge when he issued the check and not
an essential element of the crime. Defendant claims that the
3. In Ouinn and in People v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405. 494 P.2d
826. 831 (Colo. 1972) (en banc), the Colorado court found that
the provision of Colorado's bad check statute which required
dishonor by the drawee bank violated constitutional due process
and equal protection of the laws because it allowed a third
party complete discretion to determine criminal liability by
either paying or dishonoring checks. Defendant has not
challenged the constitutionality of the Utah statute either at
trial or on appeal. We. therefore, will not address the issue
sua sponte. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 92 (1984); cf.
State in Re N.H.B., 777 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (a court
will consider a constitutional issue raised for the first time
on appeal if a liberty interest is at stake).
4. Intent to defraud is not a necessary element of the bad
check offense under section 76-5-505 as now written. State v.
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314. 1315 (Utah 1983).

statute is a codification of common law fraud and, consequently,
since the corpus delicti of the offense is the conduct of passing
the check for value with the intent to defraud, the essential
elements of the crime are restricted to the mens rea and actus
reus of the perpetrator. We note, however, that Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-1-105 (1978) provides that "Common law crimes are abolished
and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other
applicable statute or ordinance." In essence, defendant asks the
court to limit the dishonor requirement to a statutorily
established presumption or prima facie case. Some jurisdictions
have done so, but their statutory language is clearly different
than Utah's. See e.g., Tolbert v. State, 294 Ala. 738, 321 So.2d
227, 230-31 (Ala. 1975); State v. Haremza. 515 P.2d 1217, 1224
(Kan. 1973). Further, defendant offers no support for his
contention that the essential elements of the offense are limited
to the mens rea or actus reus of the perpetrator or his assertion
that the statute is merely a codification of common law fraud.
In determining the essential elements of the bad check offense,
we must follow section 76-6-505#s unambiguous language rather
than the requisites of common law fraud. We, therefore, hold
that because the drawee*s refusing payment is an essential
element of the crime of issuing a bad check and that element
occurred in this case within the state, the State had proper
jurisdiction to prosecute defendant for all bad checks written on
First Interstate.
Our holding precludes the necessity of determining whether
Roosevelt, Utah, is part of federally recognized Indian country,
and whether defendant sufficiently established his membership in
an Indian tribe.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE,CONCUR:

R u s s e l l W. Bench, Jydge

\ftknt

H, Croft, Judge

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 880546-CA

v.
PATRICK DEAN COANDO,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Apellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM REVOCATION OF PROBATION AFTER
PLEA IN ABEYANCE, AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OF
GUILTY IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

DIXON HINDLEY
2035 East 3300 South
Suite 314
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE STATE PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION
REGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT HE
IS AN INDIAN AND THE ILLEGAL ACTS TOOK
PLACE IN INDIAN COUNTRY

POINT II

THE STATE PROPERLY ASSERTED ITS JURISDICTION
OVER DEFENDANT IN THAT THE CRIMES DID NOT
OCCUR IN INDIAN COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT HAS
NOT STAISFIED THE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF PROVING HIMSELF AND INDIAN...

13

POINT III IN THE EVENT THIS COURT ACCEPTS DEFENDANT'S
CLAIMS THAT THE OFFENSE OCCURRED IN INDIAN
COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN FOR
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES, THE PROPER
REMEDY IS TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO A CLASS BE
MISDEMEANOR

20

CONCLUSION

21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Browzin v. Catholic University, 527 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.
1975)

18

Goforth v. Oklahoma, 644 P.2d 114 (Okla.Crim.App. 1982)
In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D.
Ga. 1982)
Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 776 F.2d 276
(Fed. Cir. 1985)
McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353 (1922)

1619
18
18-

Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.),
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979)
19
New Mexico v. Cutnose, 532 P.2d 896 (N.M. Ct.App. 1974)

17

State v. Lane, 771 P.2d 1150 (Wash. 1989)

11-

State v. Moore, 189 Wash. 680, 66 P.2d 836 (1937)

11

State v. Clinton Perank, Case No. 860196

13

State v. Swanson, 16 Wash.App. 179/ 554 P.2d 364 (1976)
review denied, 88 Wash.2d 1014, cert, denied, 434 U.S.
967 (1977)

11

Trans-American Van Service v. U.S., 421 F.Supp. 308 (N.D.
Tex. 1976)

18

United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1980)

13

United States v. Continental Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962 (11th
Cir. 1985)

18

United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1983)
United States v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253
(1957)
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072,
aff'd in part, reversed in part, 716 F.2d 1298, on
rehearing, 773 F.2d 1087, cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 596
(1986)
Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 541 (1965)
-ii-

18,
17-

10
17

CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982)

2, 13

18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1982)

2, 14-18

18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982)

2-3, 14-1
17

RCW

9A.04.030(1) (1988)

11

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1978)

3-4, 9-10
21

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (19

)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1988)

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1971)

19
4-6, 9-10
18
1

OTHER AUTHORITIES
F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 24 (1982 ed.)

-iii-

16

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent. :

Case Np. 880546-CA

:

vs.

:
:

PATRICK DEAN COANDO,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of the Eighth
District Court, in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah,
denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
made July 9, 1988, at defendant's sentencing hearing.

This

appeal was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and (h) (1971),
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the State's jurisdiction was proper in this
matter because an essential element of each aspect of defendant's
offense of issuing bad checks was committed on property within
the State's jurisdiction?
2. Whether defendant may properly be considered to be
an Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction and
whether Roosevelt, Utah may properly be considered to be part of
federally recognized Indian Country?

3. Whether defendant's crimes must be punished as a
class B misdemeanor at the very minimum?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
18 D.S.C. S 1151 (1982):
Except as otherwise provided in sections
1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian
country," as used in this chapter, means (a)
all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the boarders of the United
States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a
state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the
Indian titles to which have not been
extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
18 U.S.C. S 1152 (1982):
Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the general laws of the United States as
to the punishment of offenses committed in
any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, except the
District of Columbia, shall extend to the
Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses
committed by one Indian against the person or
property of another Indian, nor to any Indian
committing any offense in the Indian country
who; has been punished by the local law of
the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty
stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses is or may be secured to the
Indian tribes respectively.
18 D.S.C. § 1153 (1982):
Any Indian who commits against the person
or property of another Indian or other person
any of the following offenses, namely,
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape,
carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife,
who has not attained the age of sixteen
years, assault with intent to commit rape,

incest, assault with intent to commit murder,
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault
resulting in serious bodily injury, arson,
burglary, robbery, and larceny, within the
Indian country, shall be subject to the same
laws and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses, within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
As used in this section, the offenses of
burglary and incest shall be defined and
punished in accordance with the laws of the
State in which such offense was committed as
are in force at the time of such offense.
In addition to the offenses of burglary and
incest, any other of the above offenses which
are not defined and punished by Federal law
in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States shall be defined and
punished in accordance with the laws of the
State in which such offense was committed as
are in force at the time of such offense.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-201 (1978):
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in
this state for an offense which he commits,
while either within or outside the state, by
his own conduct or that of another for which
he is legally accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed either
wholly or partly within the state; or
(b) The conduct outside the state
constitutes an attempt to commit an
offense within the state; or
(c) The conduct outside the state
constitutes a conspiracy to commit an
offense within the state and an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in
the state; or
(d) The conduct within the state
constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or
conspiracy to commit in another
jurisdiction an offense under the laws of
both this state and such other
jurisdiction.
(2) An offense is committed partly within
this state if either the conduct which is an
element of the offense, or the result which
is such an element, occurs within this state.
In homicide the "result" is either the

physical contact which causes death, or the
death itself; and if the body of a homicide
victim is found within the state, the death
shall be presumed to have occurred within the
state.
(3) An offense which is based on an omission
to perform a duty imposed by the law of this
state is committed within the state
regardless of the location of the offender at
the time of the omission.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1988)
(1) Any person who issues or passes a
check or draft for the payment of money, for
the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money,
property, or other thing of value or paying
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or
rent, knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee,
is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person
who issues a check or draft for which payment
is refused by the drawee is presumed to know
the check or draft would not be paid if he
had no account with the drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a
check or draft for the payment of money, for
the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, corporation, any money,
property, or other thing of value or paying
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or
rent, payment of which check or draft is
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of
issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to
make good and actual payment to the payee in
the amount of the refused check or draft
within 14 days of his receiving actual notice
of the check or draft's nonpayment.
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or
draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of
checks or drafts made or drawn in this
state within a period not exceeding six
months amounts to a sum of not more than
$200, such offense shall be a class B
misdemeanor.

(b) If the check or draft or checks or
drafts made or drawn in this state within
a period not exceeding six months amounts
to a sum exceeding $200 but not more than
$300, such offense shall be a class A
misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or
drafts made or drawn in this state within
a period not exceeding six months amounts
to a sum exceeding $300 but not more than
$1,000, such offense shall be a felony of
the third degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or
drafts made or drawn in this state within
a period not exceeding six months amounts
to a sum exceeding $1,000, such offense
shall be a second degree felony.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 26, 1987, defendant was charged with the
crime of issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1953, as amended) (R. 2).
Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge on November 23,
1987, before the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and for
Duchesne County, the Honorable Dennis L. Draney, presiding (R.
98).

Subsequent to the guilty plea, defendant entered into a

plea in abeyance agreement (R. 99). On April 25, 1988, defendant
was found to have violated the agreement and a judgement of
guilty was entered (R. 60-61).

At an order to show cause hearing

held on July 19, 1988, defendant made a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, which motion was denied and sentence was
imposed (R. 133-34, 150-51).

Notice of appeal by defendant was

filed on August 5, 1988 (R. 74).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
An amended information was filed by the Duchesne County
Attorney in the Seventh Circuit Court of the State of Utah,
Duchesne County, Roosevelt Department on October 26, 1987, which
charged defendant with the crime of issuing bad checks, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1953,
as amended) (R. 2). The crimes were alleged to have been
committed at Roosevelt, Duchesne County, Utah and Vernal, Uintah
County, Utah (R. 2). Seven checks were written to the
establishments of Safeway, Tri-Mart, Vernal Drug, and Triangle
Oil, at a total amount of $354.26 (R. 2). Defendant pled guilty
to these charges on November 23, 1987 and an abeyance agreement
was entered into, under which defendant was to make restitution
payments and to refrain from any other similar conduct or legal
violations (R. 87, 98).
On April 25, 1988, defendant was found to have violated
the agreement for failure to make the required restitution
payments and issuing additional bad checks (R. 60-61).
Subsequently, the plea in abeyance was set aside and judgment was
entered on the guilty plea (R. 61).
On July 19, 1988, the Eighth Judicial District Court
heard an order to show cause why the previously given probation
should not be revoked and why the sentence previously suspended
should not be imposed (R. 132). Defendant moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that defendant is a Uintah
Indian and the offenses were committed on the Uintah-Ouray
Reservation (R. 134-35).

Defendant proffered only his own

testimony in support of his assertions (R. 135).

Defendant testified that although his permanent address
was a post office box in Vernal, Utah, he resided wherever his
job took him (R. 136). He also testified that he and five other
Indians have a casing company called F.A.C.S. (R. 137). Further,
defendant explained that his father is full-blooded Shoshoni
Indian, his mother is enrolled in the Uintah Band, and defendant,
himself, was one-fourth shoshoni and three-eighths Uintah Indian
(R. 137).
Upon cross-examination, defendant maintained that he
was a Uintah Indian and that he possessed enrollment cards from
the Uintah and Wind River (Shoshoni) Reservations (R. 140).
However, no enrollment cards were produced, or admitted into
evidence (R. 142, 43). On cross-examination defendant also
admitted that Vernal Drug is located on State ground (R. 141).
After hearing defendant's proffers, the Eighth Judicial
District Court denied defendant's motion, finding that the
evidence did not support defendant's claim that he is an enrolled
member of the Ute Indian Tribe (R. 146). Additionally, the court
noted that some of the bad checks were written on State land and
all of the checks were drawn on a bank whicl> is not on the
reservation (R. 146-47).

Defendant was sentenced to the Utah

State Prison for a term not to exceed five years (R. 151).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's jurisdiction in this matter was proper
regardless of defendant's assertion that he is an Indian for
federal jurisdictional purposes and the offenses occurred in
Indian Country.

Essential elements of each bad check offense

that of the drawee's refusal of payment, occurred at the First
Interstate Bank of Vernal, which is located within the State's
jurisdiction.

Statutory law in Utah and case law in sister

jurisdictions supports the State's assertion of jurisdiction in
matters such as the instant case.

Thus, this Court need not

reach the issue of whether defendant is an Indian.
Alternatively, defendant's proffered evidence failed to
establish that he is recognized as an Indian for federal criminal
jurisdiction purposes.

His illogical testimony concerning his

Indian blood heritage and failure to offer credible evidence
concerning his recognition by the tribe as an Indian support the
court's conclusion that defendant failed to meet his burden in
establishing himself as an Indian.

The State also reasserts that

the City of Roosevelt, Utah is not part of the Uintah-Ouray
Reservation based upon its arguments in the case of State v.
Perank which are currently under advisement before the Utah
Supreme Court.

The State submits that this Court should at least

refrain from a determination of the issue until the Supreme Court
has ruled.
Finally, if this Court accepts defendant's arguments
and finds that the State's jurisdiction was improperly exercised
in this case, the State submits that defendants' criminal acts
must at least be punishable by the State as a class B
misdemeanor.

Defendant has pled guilty to issuing these bad

checks, two of which, totalling $70.00 were passed on state land
in every element of the offense.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATE PROPERLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION
REGARDLESS OF DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT HE IS
AN INDIAN AND THE ILLEGAL ACTS TOOK PLACE IN
INDIAN COUNTRY.
Defendant's claims that jurisdiction in this matter
should properly be before the Ute Tribal Court or in an
appropriate Federal Court is based on his assertions that he is
an Indian and the crimes took place on an Indian Reservation.
(See Br. of App. at 4.)

However, whether defendant may legally

be recognized as an Indian and whether certain localities such as
Roosevelt, Utah are part of Indian Country need not be addressed
by this Court.

Jurisdiction is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §§

76-1-201 (1978) and 76-6-505 (1988).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1978) directs:
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in
this state for an offense which he commits,
while either within or outside the state, by
his own conduct or that of another for which
he is legally accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed
either wholly or partly within the
state;
(2) An offense is committed partly within
this state if either the conduct which is an
element of the offense, or the result which
is such an element, occurs within this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1988) defines the elements of the
crime of issuing a bad check or draft as follows:
(1) Any person who issues or passes a
check or draft for the payment of money, for
the purpose of obtaining from any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money,
property, or other thing of value or paying
for any services, wages, salary, Jabor, or

rent, knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee,
is guilty of a issuing a bad check or draft.
(Emphasis added.)

Therefore, according to these statutes, the

State may correctly claim jurisdiction over a charge of issuing
bad checks if any of the elements of the crime, i.e. (1) passing
the check; (2) knowing that the check will not be honored; and
(3) refusal by the drawee to pay, have been committed within the
State.
Defendant's guilty plea, entered November 23, 1987, to
the third degree felony of issuing bad checks in an amount
exceeding $300 but less than $1,000 (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6505(3)(c) (1988)) is based upon seven checks written to Safeway,
Tri-Mart, Vernal Drug, and Triangle Oil (R. 2). Although some of
these establishments are located in Roosevelt (which defendant
argues is on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservations) (see Brief
of App. at 5-6), the First Interstate Bank of Vernal, drawee of
each of these bad checks, is clearly within state jurisdiction
because Vernal, Uintah County, Utah, is not part of Indian
Country.

Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072,

1188, aff'd in part, reversed in part, 716 F.2d 1298, on
rehearing, 773 F.2d 1087, cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986).
Therefore, although there may be elements of the crime that
occurred on land arguably part of Indian Country, the element of
the drawee refusing payment occurred on land that is definitely
not in Indian country.

Accordingly, § 76-1-201 directs that

defendant is subject to prosecution within the State regardless
of his assertions that he is an Indian and the checks passed to

i n

businesses in Roosevelt, Utah were located on land subject to
federal jurisdiction.
In the recent case of State v. Lane, 771 P.2d 1150
(Wash. 1989), the Supreme Court of Washington considered whether
the State of Washington had jurisdiction to try three defendants
on charges of aggravated first degree murder when the victim was
killed at Fort Lewis, Washington, land held under exclusive
federal jurisdiction.

771 P.2d at 1151.

The court concluded

that the "State of Washington may exercise jurisdiction over a
criminal offense if an essential element of the offense occurred
within the state but outside the land ceded to the federal
government (where the offense culminated)."

Id.

at 1152.

Washington's statutory language mirrors the statutory language of
Utah previously quoted.

Specifically, RCW

9A.04.030(1) (1988)

states that "[t]he following persons are liable for punishment:
(1) A person who commits in the state any crime, in whole or in
part."

The court explained that an offense "is committed 'in

part' in Washington, within the contemplation of the criminal
jurisdiction statute, when an 'essential element' of the offense
has been committed here."

771 P.2d at 1153-54; citing, State v.

Moore, 189 Wash. 680, 690-92, 66 P.2d 836 (1937); State v.
Swanson, 16 Wash.App. 179, 180, 554 P.2d 364 (1976), review
denied, 88 Wash.2d 1014, cert, denied, 434 U.S. 967, (1977).
In the Washington case, the State conceded that "the
fatal wounds were inflicted, and the victim's death occurred, in
this area of exclusive federal jurisdiction."

771 P.2d at 1153.

However, the State asserted that the element of "premeditation"

occurred within the State's jurisdiction, and that this element
was an essential

component

of the charge.

2^d.

The Supreme Court

of Washington agreed:
premeditation is an element separate and
distinct from the specific intent to kill
required for first degree murder; it also
distinguishes first degree murder from second
degree murder. The failure of th€> state to
sufficiently establish premeditation has been
held to require reversal of a conviction for
aggravated first degree murder. Clearly,
therefore, premeditation constitutes an
essential element of the crime of aggravated
first degree murder.
It follows from the foregoing, that if the
State makes a sufficient showing to establish
that premeditation occurred in this state
outside Fort Lewis before the infliction of
the fatal wounds at Fort Lewis, then the
State of Washington has jurisdiction to try
petitioners for the crime of aggravated first
degree murder.
771 P.2d at 1154-55.

In the case at hand, the element of the

crime of issuing bad checks that the drawee refused payment is
essential because without the final step of refusal of payment by
the drawee, the crime of issuing bad checks does not occur.

If

the bank actually made payment, or the establishment never
tendered the check for payment, an essential element would be
lacking and the defendant could not be found guilty of the
offense.
In the instant case, this essential element of the
crime was completed.

With the First Interstate Bank of Vernal's

refusal of payment, defendant's offense reached fruition.

The

State's jurisdiction over defendant should be affirmed according
to § 76-1-201 because this offense was committed "partly within
the state."

For this reason, it is irrelevant whether defendant

is an Indian or whether some other elements of the crime occurred
on the Reservation and this Court need not address either of
these issues.
POINT II
THE STATE PROPERLY ASSERTED ITS JURISDICTION
OVER DEPENDANT IN THAT THE CRIMES DID NOT
OCCUR IN INDIAN COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT HAS NOT
SATISFIED THE FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF PROVING HIMSELF AN INDIAN.
As defendant points out in his brief, whether exclusive
federal criminal jurisdiction exists depends upon two prongs (See
Brief of App. at 5.)

These prongs are whether the criminal acts

occurred in "Indian Country" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1976) and whether defendant may be found to be "Indian" for
purposes of jurisdiction under federal law.

See United States v.

Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262-64 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, denied,
444 U.S. 859 (1980).

Defendant failed to establish either of

these prongs, and, if this court reaches these issues, it may
still find that jurisdiction was properly asserted by the State.
A.

Roosevelt, Utah Is Not Located In Indian Country.

This issue has previously been extensively briefed and
argued in the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Clinton Perank, Case
No. 860196.
11, 1988.

The Court took Perank under advisement on October

This Court may wish to refrain from ruling on this

issue, should it become necessary to address the issue, until the
Supreme Court has ruled.

In any event, Appendix A contains the

State's argument on this issue in the Perank case.

The State

reasserts the argument in this Court that Roosevelt is not in
Indian country and incorporates Appendix A as its analysis of the
issue.

B.

Defendant Failed To Make The Necessary Showing That
He Is An Indian For Purposes of Exclusive Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction.

While 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153 preclude state
criminal jurisdiction over "Indians" who commit crimes on Indian
reservations, defendant cannot avail himself of that defense
because he did not meet his evidentiary burden to establish that
he is an Indian.

The testimony of defendant at the Order to Show

Cause Hearing on July 19, 1988 concerning his status as an Indian
consisted of the following:
Q:

(by Defense)

And are you an Indian?

A:

Yes, I am

Q:

What is your affiliation?

A: My father in [sic] one-half—my father in
[sic] one full—he is four-fourths Shoshoni
Indian off the Wind River Reservation, and
I'm one-fourth Shoshoni off the Wind River
Reservation. My mother is enrolled in the
Uintah Band over here on the Ute--what they
call the Ute Tribe Reservation, but she is in
the Uintah Band, and so am I. I'm threeeights Uintah Indian.
Q:

Does the tribe recognize you as a member?

A:

They do.

(R. 137.)
This testimony fails to offer any objective proof of
defendant's recognition by any tribe, such as enrollment cards
which were never produced or offered into evidence, or the
testimony of any other tribal members or authorities.

Further,

defendant's testimony is internally inaccurate and is, therefore,
incredible.

Defendant testified that his father is full-blooded

Shoshoni Indian, yet defendant states he is only one-fourth

Shoshoni.

He also states that he is three-eighths Uintah Indian.

Presumably this would make defendant's mother three-quarters
Uintah Indian and leave her one-quarter unknown to this court.
If defendant's father is, in fact, full-blooded Shoshoni and his
mother is three-quarters Uintah and one-quarter unknown,
defendant should logically be one-half Shoshoni, three-eighths
Uintah and one-eighth unknown.

However, defendant's incredible

assertions are that he is one-quarter Shoshoni, three-eighths
Uintah, leaving another three-eighths unknown.

By his

description, his largest tribal claim by blood, the Shoshoni
tribe, has become the smallest blood connection.
Aside from these inaccuracies, defendant only asserted
that "the tribe" recognized him as a member.
which tribe he was referring to.

He did not specify

Surely, defendant cannot claim

that because the Shoshoni tribe recognizes him, the Ute Tribe has
jurisdiction over his actions on the Ute Reservation.
defendant was asked by the court if he had

When

any further evidence

or testimony to present, he simply reasserted his position that
"the facts state for themselves [defendant] is a member of the
Uintah Band, that the incidents alleged took place on the
reservation, and that according to federal Indian law the court
is without jurisdiction."

(R. 143). He did not present a Wind

River enrollment card even though he earlier stated that he had
such a card with him.

Nor did he present a Ute enrollment card.

That evidence does not qualify defendant as an Indian
for purposes of avoiding state jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§
1152 and 1153. As a preeminent authority on Indian law has

stated:

"Several important Indian statutes, such as the federal

criminal jurisdiction statutes [citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and
1153] . . . use the word "Indian" without further definition. . .
[T]he courts have taken the position in this situation that
the term 'Indian' means an individual who has Indian blood and
who is regarded as an Indian by his or her tribe or Indian
community."

F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 24 (1982

ed.) (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).

Defendant's

evidence leaves in doubt his status vis-a-vis the Tribe.
"Tribal membership as determined by the Indian tribe or
community itself is often an essential element.

In fact, a

person of complete Indian ancestry who has never had relations
with any Indian tribe may be considered a non-Indian for some
legal purposes."

Ld. at 19 (footnote omitted).

"Some people

therefore can be an Indian for one purpose but not for another."
Id. at 26. And Cohen specifies that one who is an "Indian" for
some purposes may not necessarily qualify to avoid state criminal
jurisdiction.

Id.

"[T]wo elements must be satisfied before it can be
found that the appellant is an Indian under federal law. . . [He
must have] a significant percentage of Indian blood . . . [and
he] must be recognized as an Indian either by the federal
government or by some tribe or society of Indians.M
Oklahoma, 644 P.2d 114, 116 (Okla.Crim.App. 1982).

Goforth v.
In that case,

"[t]he record [was] devoid . . • of any evidence tending to show
that the appellant was recognized as an Indian.

Absent such

recognition, we cannot hold that [he] is an Indian under federal

law . . . ."

Id.

Since the appellant was not an Indian under 18

U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153, those statutes did not preempt state
jurisdiction.

Id.

Having failed to establish the nature and extent of any
relationship he may have with the tribe, defendant in this case
also has not shown that he is an Indian.
therefore was not preempted.

Utah's jurisdiction

CJ[. New Mexico v. Cutnose, 532

P.2d 896, 898 (N.M. Ct.App. 1974) ("The jurisdictional challenge
was to a court exercising general jurisdiction. . . . The burden
was upon defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the
district court.")

Since he sought to invoke a special exception

to the State's jurisdiction, he was the moving party and had the
burden of producing prima facie evidence that he is an Indian.
Such facts were peculiarly available to defendant. He,
far more easily than the State, could produce evidence of his
tribal relations.

Indeed, the State otherwise would have to try

to prove a negative (i.e., that defendant is not an Indian), and
would have to meet that difficult burden in more or less an
evidentiary vacuum, on nothing more than the defendant's bald
allegation.

Defendant had the burden of going forward with

sufficient evidence to show prima facie that he is an Indian.
"The party who asserts a fact has the burden to
establish the fact."
541, 546 (1965).

Yeazell v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d

"The ordinary rule, based on considerations of

fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant to establish
facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary."
States v.

United

New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n.5

(1957); Browzin v. Catholic University, 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).

In other words, "the party in the best position to

present the requisite evidence should bear the burden of proof .
. .,"

United States v. Continental Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962, 964

(11th Cir. 1985), and "[t]he party with the best knowledge
normally sustains the burden."

Lindahl v. Office of Personnel

Management, 776 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
If defendant did not have the burden of production, the
State would have the extreme burden of proving a negative, which
burden the law does not favor.

Trans-American Van Service v.

U.S., 421 F.Supp. 308, 331 (N.D. Tex. 1976).

And the State would

have to prove that negative without the defendant's having to
make any evidentiary showing whatever.

"In that situation it

would not make too much sense to thrust upon the [State] the
burden of disproving the truth of the bare [allegation]."
Lindahl, 776 F.2d at 780.
United States v. Hester, 719 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1983),
illustrates the principle that a criminal defendant has the
initial burden on whether or not he is an Indian.

That case,

like the instant one, involved 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Hester argued
against federal jurisdiction because the statute's coverage does
"not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against . . .
another Indian" and the indictment had not alleged Hester's nonIndian status, ^d. at 1042.
The Government argued that it did not have the "burden
of alleging and establishing the non-applicability of this
exception to ,S 1152."

.Id. The court agreed, citing, McKelvey v.

United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) ("it is incumbent on one
who relies on such an exception to set it up and establish it").
As the court correctly noted, "It is far more manageable for the
defendant to shoulder the burden of producing evidence that he is
a member of a federally recognized tribe than it is for the
Government to produce evidence that he is not. . . . "
F.2d 1043.

Ld. at 719

The Government does not have "the burden of going

forward on that issue."

Id.

Similar analysis, although under a different (civil)
statute, prevailed in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592
F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).

The

court held against the tribe's position on burden of proof, in
part because the tribe's opponent otherwise would "have to try to
prove a negative."

Ici. at 590.

In this case, defendant is the party who would benefit
from proof that he is an Indian, and he therefore has the burden
of establishing that fact.

In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation,

560 F.Supp. 1006, 1008 (N.D. Ga. 1982).

We acknowledge that the

State ultimately has the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3),

but that does not alter

defendant's burden of producing evidence in the first instance to
2
establish prima facie that he is an Indian.
If he meets the
Section 76-1-501(3) states: "The existence of jurisdiction and
venue are not elements of the offense but shall be established by
a preponderance of the evidence."
2
That the State has the burden of persuasion on jurisdiction
does not necessarily mean it has the burden of going forward on
that issue. Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc. 537 F.Supp. 730,
735 (N.D. Va. 1982). Section 76-1-501(3) leaves it to the court
to delineate whose burden it is to go forward with evidence in a

burden, "then the ultimate burden of proof remains, of course,
upon the Government."

Hester, 719 F.2d at 1043.

The State did not have the burden of refuting
defendant's "Indian-status" allegation until he had given it a
full prima facie basis in fact. And the record shows defendant
failed to present evidence on all facts necessary to make a prima
facie showing.
POINT III
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT ACCEPTS DEFENDANT'S
CLAIMS THAT THE OFFENSE OCCURRED IN INDIAN
COUNTRY AND DEFENDANT IS AN INDIAN FOR
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONAL PURPOSES, THE PROPER
REMEDY IS TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO A CLASS B
MISDEMEANOR.
Initially, the State reasserts it's position that the
State's jurisdiction was proper in the instant case because an
essential element of each illegally passed check occurred in
Vernal, Utah, which is off of the reservation.

Alternatively,

the State maintains that no elements of the offense occurred in
Indian Country and defendant has not established himself as an
Indian for purposes of federal jurisdiction.

However, if this

court accepts defendant's claims, defendant's offense of issuing
bad checks, to which he entered a guilty plea on November 23,

o
Cont. particular case, and that burden may shift with the
circumstances. "[T]here is not and cannot be any one general
solvent for [allocating] the burden of proof in all cases. It is
merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in
the different situations." Mashpee Tribe, 592 F.2d at 589 n.13,
quoting, 9 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2486, p. 274 (3d ed. 1940)
(bracketed word in the court's opinion). In some cases, the
State may have the burden of production as well as the burden of
persuasion, but not here. Fairness and efficiency require that
the Indian criminal defendant have the burden of production on
his Indian status.

1987, should be punished as a class B misdemeanor.

Two checks,

one for $20 and one for $50, were passed to Vernal Drug (R. 2).
This establishment, as defendant admits, is not located on the
reservation.

(See Brief of App. at 5-6.)

Therefore, according

to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-201 and 76-6-505, the State's assertion
of jurisdiction over the offenses committed in Vernal, Utah is
proper and defendant should be punished for the commission of a
class B misdemeanor at the very least.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to uphold the jurisdiction of the District Court and affirm
defendant's conviction.
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APPENDIX A

Basin.

And finally, given the state of the record, it cannot be

eaid that Perank's status as an Indian under 18 U.S.C. Sections
1152 end 1153 was not established below.
ARGUMENT
I. THE OFFENSE WAS NOT COMMITTED WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY
AND THE STATE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
Perank claims his crime vas committed within Indian country
as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1151, and that—coupled with the allegation that he is an Indian—deprived the state district court of
jurisdiction.

The following section of this brief will demon-

strate that the crime did not take place within Indian country
because the original Uintah reservation has been disestablished
and today consists only of "trust lands,11 and Perankfs offense
was committed outside those trust lands. We first examine the
principles established by the United States Supreme Court for
determining whether a reservation has been disestablished.

This

is followed by an examination of the legislation and facts and
circumstances surrounding the opening of the Uintah reservation
which show that it has been disestablished.
A.

General Principles Governing Disestablishment
Pursuant to the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat. 245, 263),

as amended, a Presidential Proclamation issued on July 14, 1905
(34 Stat. 3119), providing that all the unallotted and unreserved
lands of the original Uintah reservation were restored to the
public domain and opened for public settlement under the home*
stead and townsite laws.

It is settled law that some surplus

land acts diminished reservations, see, e.g.. Rosebud Sioux Tribe

interpretation and marked a new direction in the Supreme Court's
view of turn-of-the-century legislation concerning Indian reservations.

Thus, the en banc majority concluded that "[u]nder the

Solem standards neither the Uncompahgre Reservation nor the
Uintah Reservation has been disestablished or diminished by any
of the congressional enactments in question".

Ute Indian Tribe,

773 F.2d at 1090-91.
The majorityfs reading of Solem is not correct.

Solent did

not establish new "standards" and it did not alter the principles
announced in Seymour, Mattz, DeCoteau and Rosebud, which the
Court in Solem described as having "established a fairly clean
analytical structure for distinguishing those surplus land acts
that diminished reservations from those acts that simply offered
non-Indians the opportunity to purchase lands within established
reservation boundaries."

465 U.S. at 470. Although the Court

has added several relevant factors to the traditional indicia of
legislative intent, including how Congress and the Department of
the Interior have treated the area in later years and whether the
area has "lost its Indian character" because it is "predominately
populated by non-Indians" (Solem, 465 U.S. at 471 ft n.12), the
Court has not departed from the governing principle "that congressional intent will control" (Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 5B6, and
Solem, 465 U.S. at 470-71).
In determining whether an Indian reservation exists, one must
therefore first examine the face of the relevant legislation.
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587. In each of the disestablishment cases

tribal members could harvest timber on certain portions of the
opened lands, "only as long as the land remained part of the
public domain.*

Sec. 9, 35 Stat. 464. The Court acknowledged

that even this oblique reference was evidence of disestablishment; It found, however, that because the phrase was "isolated,"
it could not be dispositive.

Solem, 465 U.S. at 475*

In justifying its expansive interpretation of Solem, the en
banc majority also relied upon a footnote in Solem stating that
there was "considerable doubt as to what Congress meant in
using.-." public domain terminology in the Solem legislation
since the affected lands "could be conceived of as being in the
•public domain9 inasmuch as they were available for settlement"
(id,, 465 U.S. at 475, n.17).

It is evident, however, that the

Court did not intend this statement in Solem to overrule its
prior decisions and to discount the significance of public domain
language in every other instance.

The Court had already indi-

cated that such language supported the disestablishment claim
and, in any event, the Court would hardly have confined its comments to one sentence in a footnote had it intended such a drastic departure from the views, expressed by both the majority and
dissenting Justices in prior cases, regarding the significance of
such restoration language.
The en banc majority's decision to the contrary also overlooks the Solem Court9s later observation, in the context of
subsequent jurisdictional history, that:
Unentered lands were considered a part of the
reservation. They were available for allotment to
tribal members, they were leased for the benefit of

Strip"—* 7,000-ecre tract located on the edge of the original
Uintah reservation—was disestablished by the Act of Kay 24, 1888
(25 Stat. 157). See, e.g., Ute Indian Tribe, 773 P.2d at 1098
(Seymour, J., concurring).
id,, 521 F.Supp. at 1099.

Compare with district court opinion,
See also panel opinion, id., 716 F.2d

at 1318 (Doyle, J., dissenting).

As Judge Seymour stated, "Con-

gress was completely clear when it terminated Uintah rights in
the Cilsonite Strip. . . ."

Id^, 773 F.2d at 1098.

Yet the

operative provisions concerning the Cilsonite Strip used the same
language as the 1902 (Uintah) Surplus Land Act and expressly restored the area "to the public domain" (Section 1, 25 Stat. 157).
The en banc majority offered no reason why the restoration language contained In the 1902 Uintah Act should be Interpreted differently, and there is none.li/
3.

The decision of the en banc majority is also at odds vith

the decisions of other courts of appeals in disestablishment
cases.

The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, in a long line of deci-

sions, have consistently recognized that restoration to public
domain language is an explicit expression of congressional intent
to disestablish.ii/

Also, decisions of the Tenth Circuit prior

18. The dissent, on the other hand, relied upon the understanding of the parties regarding the effect of the 1888 Act in
Interpreting the 1902 Surplus Land Act, as amended. See Ute
Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1112.
19. See, e.g., Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 90
(8th Cir. 1975). affd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); United States ex
rel. Feather v. Erickaon, 489 F.2d 99, 100 (8th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975); United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478
F.2d 684, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1973); Beardslee v. United States, 387

Supreme Court remarked that:
The doctrine first announced in Wilcox and
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, that a tract lawfully appropriated to any purpose becomes thereafter severed from the mass of public lands . . . has been
reaffirmed and applied by this court in such a
great number and variety of cases that it may now
be regarded as one of the fundamental principles
underlying the land system of this country.
Hastings and Dakota Railroad Co., 132 U.S. at 360-61.

Contrary

to the en banc majority's view, because the reservation of a
tract removed it from the public domain,22/ later restoration of
the tract to the public domain firmly signified the end of reservation status.il/
In sum, the en banc majority's interpretation not only is
inconsistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts in Indian reservation boundary cases, but also

21. (Contfd.) F. 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1904); United States v.
Techenor, 12 F. 415, 421 (D. Ore. 1882); Kansas Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 13 F. 106, 107 (D. Kan.
1881); and United States v. Payne, 6 F. 883, 893-94 (W.D. Ark.
1881). •Public domain" and "public lands" traditionally have
been regarded as "equivalent" concepts. Barker v. Harvey, 181
U.S. 481, 490 (1901).
22. As the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior explained years later in regard to the original Uintah reservation,
"[a]lthough the . . . reservation had been created out of the
public domain, the land comprising it did not occupy the status
of public domain land while included within the reservation. • •
•" Solicitor Opinion M-36051, at 5 (December 7, 1950).
23. See Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S.
317 (1942). The issue in that case was whether the Sioux Tribe
was entitled to compensation for certain lands reserved for it by
executive orders but later "'restored to the public domain9 • .
." by the President. Id. at 325. In holding that no compensation was due, the Supreme Court expressly found that the two Executive Orders restoring the lands to the public domain (I Kappler 884-85, 899) "terminated the reservation. . . ." Id. at
330.

opening the reservation.

It clearly shows a congressional Intent

to restore the surplus lands to the public domain and disestablish the reservation.
After disregarding clear language of disestablishment on the
basis of its misreading of Solem, the en banc majority proceeded
to ignore other factors that must be considered not only under
Solem but also under the Supreme Courtfs prior decisions.

Sum-

marizing these decisions, the Court in Solem stated that when the
area involved *has long since lost its Indian character, ve have
acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have
occurred. . . ."

465 U.S. at 471. Thus, ••who actually moved

onto opened reservation lands is . . . relevant to deciding
whether a surplus land Act diminished a reservation. . . ." Id.
By focusing all its attention on Solem and treating it as
setting forth new principles, the en banc majority blinded itself
to the teachings of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions.

In

addition to the statutory language, "the •surrounding circumstances,9 and the •legislative history9 are to be examined11 in
interpreting surplus land enactments.

Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587.

Accord, e.g., Solem, 465 U.S. at 469-70. The record here demonstrates that the en banc majority did not consider these factors
in a manner consistent with the relevant precedents.

Subsection

3 below reviews these other relevant factors. They vividly demonstrate that the decision below will not materially advance the
interests of tribal sovereignty, and will severely hamper the
functioning of State and local governments.

period.

See General Allotment Act of 1887 (24 Stat. 388); DeCo-

teau at 432-33; and Solem at 466-67.
The Uintah reservation contained vast areas of land in excess
of the lands needed to aatlafy the allotments to the Indians.
Therefore, Congress enacted the Act of May 27, 1902 (32 Stat.
245), which was the Indian Appropriations Act for that year, and
Included a provlaion restoring any lands not allotted to the
Indians to the public domain.

The relevant portion of the Act

states:
That the Secretary of the Interior, with the
consent thereto of the majority of the adult male
Indians of the Uintah and the White River tribes of
Ute Indians, be ascertained as soon as practicable
by an Inspector, shall cause to be allotted to each
head of a family eighty acres of agricultural land
which can be irrigated and forty acres of such land
to each other member of said tribes, said allotments to be made prior to October first, nineteen
hundred and three, on which date all the unallotted
lands within said reservation shall be restored to
the public domain: ~. I ~. (Emphasis added) •
Thus, the original 1902 Act authorizing the opening of the reservation contained "public domain" language which is language "precisely suited" to disestablishment.

DeCoteau, supra, at 445-446.

Again, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Knelp, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), the
Supreme Court held that language restoring surplus reservation
land to the public domain (even though the original act was amended to provide for a different method of opening) demonstrated
"an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment."
592.

Id. at

See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).

An important observation is that, In 1902, Congress believed
the consent of the Indians had to be obtained before their lands

reservation.

Tha Department of Interior viewed the administra-

tive task under the 1903 Act to be one of Baking allotments to
the Indiana and restoration of the aurplua lands to tha public
domain aa aet forth in the 1902 Act.

In May of 1903, Inspector

McLaughlin met vith the Utes in the Uinta Basin to explain to
them that the reservation vas to be terminated without their conaent and that allotments vould be made.

The following extract

from the transcript of that meeting clearly shows McLaughlin's
understanding that the reservation boundaries were to be extinguished (JX 162, pg. 42):
Inspector McLaughlin:
A number of your speakers have said that you do
not want your land stolen from you. My friends,
these hills, these streams, these valleys will all
remain just as they are. There will be no change
in the nature of the country but the improvements
that will come when white people come in among you.
My friends, Bed Cap said my talk was cloudy, and
you do not understand it. You are the people who
are in the dark in regard to the force of this act
of congress, and I am trying to bring you into the
light. You say that line Is very heavy and that
the reservation is nailed down upon the border.
That is very true as applying to the past many
years and up to now, but congress has provided
legislation which will pull up the nails which hold
down that line and after next year there will be no
outside boundary line to this reservation. (Emphasis added).±2/
d.

The Act of March 3, 1905
The time aet by the 1904 Act for opening the

reservation (March 10, 1905) vaa running out.

Early in 1905, the

25. For a more detailed veraion of McLaughlin1a negotiations
vith the Indiana, aee JX 162, pp. 42*45. A eubsequent report of
McLaughlin, eummarizing hla meetings vith the Utes, can be found
at LD 101, pp. 9-12*

two, such portions of the lands vithin the Uintah
Indian Reservation as he considers necessary, and
he may also set apart and reserve any reservoir
site or other lands necessary to conserve and pro*
tect the water supply for the Indians or for
general agricultural development, and may confirm
such rights to water thereon as have already accrued: Provided, That the proceeds from any timber
on such addition as may with safety be sold prior
to June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and twenty,
shall be paid to said Indians in accordance with
the provisions of the act opening the reservation.
(Emphasis in original.)
e.

The Relationship Between the 1902 and 1905 Acts
The mn banc majority thought the 1905 Act (33

Stat. 1069), extending the time for opening, supplanted the 1902
Act (32 Stat. 263), restoring the lands to the public domain.
Compare Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089 with id. at 1111-12
(Seth, J., dissenting).

That reasoning is flawed and is not sup-

ported by the Acts, the legislative history or surrounding
circumstances.
It is true that the 1905 Act does not specifically repeat the
"public domain" language of the 1902 Act.

Rather, the 1905 Act

contained a provision that the unallotted lands were to be disposed of under "the general provisions of the homestead and townsite laws, . . . and shall be opened to settlement and entry by
proclamation of the President."

But the 1905 Act did not purport

to change whether there should be a disestablishment.
already been clearly stated in the 1902 Act.

That had

The 1905 Act merely

addressed the manner and procedures for accomplishing disestablishment.
two.

There is no conflict or inconsistency between the

change the 1902 intent. . . * ) .

See also, debates at 39 Cong.

Rec. 1181-1185, 3522 (Jan. 21, 1905, LD 103).
What Congress was actually concerned about in 1905 (other
than a speedy conclusion of the allotment process) vas that land
speculators might deprive bona-fide homesteaders of the land.
See •Indian Appropriations Bill, 1906," Hearings, Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. of Indian Affairs, 39th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905, LD
100 at 30). Nowhere in the cited subcommittee debates is there
any statement that the purpose of the limitations on entry vas to
keep the reservation intact.

To the contrary, the pertinent dis-

cussion reveals that even with such limitations the land would
still be restored to the public domain.

Senator Teller, one of

the advocates of the limitation on entry stated at the hearings:
"I am not going to consent to any speculators getting public land
if I can help it" (Senate Subcommittee Hearings, supra, LD 100 at
30) (emphasis added)•

Further, there is nothing in the congres-

sional debates or reports to indicate that Congress ever intended
or desired to preserve the original exterior boundary of the Uintah reservation.
The real purpose and intent of the 1905 Act vas not only to
implement the restoration of the surplus lands to the public do*
sain as provided in the 1902 Act, but also to allow entry and
settlement of such lands only under the homestead and townsite
lavs in order to prevent speculation.

Limitations on entry such

as those contained in the 1905 Act are not inconsistent vith the
previously expressed intent of Congress to restore surplus lands
to the public domain and disestablish the reservation.

Again,

underlying the 1902 Act.

The 1905 Proclamation is similar to the

one involved in Rosebud and constitutes an "unambiguous, contemporaneous, statement, by the Nation's Chief Executive of a perceived disestablishment. . •» (J^, 430 U.S. at 602*03), and
unmistakably reflects the intent of Congress.

See id, at 603.

On this subject the en banc majority opinion is again silent.
3. Additional Considerations Support Disestablishment
In addition to examining the legislation opening a
reservation, the Supreme Court has stated that another component
of its "fairly clean analytical structure91 is to examine the
subsequent history of the area:
On a more pragmatic level, ve have recognized
that who actually moved onto opened reservation
lands is also relevant to deciding whether a
surplus land act diminished a reservation. Where
non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened portion
of a reservation and the area has long since lost
its Indian character, ve have acknowledged that de
facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, supra,
at 58B, n 3, and 604-605, 51 L Ed 2d 660, 97 S Ct
1361; Decoteau v. District County Court, 429 US at
428, 43 L Ed 2d 300, 95 S Ct 1082. In addition to
the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to
de facto diminishment, ve look to the subsequent
demographic history of opened lands as one additional clue as to what Congress expected would happen once land on a particular reservation was
opened to non-Indian settlers.
Solem, 465 U.S. St 471.
The Court further noted that:
When an area is predominately populated by nonIndians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian
allotments, finding that the land remains Indian
Country seriously burdens the administration of
State and local governments.
Solem at 471, n.12.

margin expressly recognire that, with respect to the original
Uintah reservation, the unallotted and unreserved lands vere restored to the public domain under the provisions of the 1902 Act.
The record shows as veil that officials of the Interior Department treated the original Uintah reservation as having been
disestablished.

Thus, with the opening of the reservation in

1905, Department officials immediately began referring to the
original area as the "former" reservation.

For decades after the

opening, Interior officials consistently administered only the
trust lends (the tribal grazing reserve, the allotments, and the
lands later restored to tribal ownership and reservation status)
as the Tribe's existing reservation,21/ a practice that continued
until recently.29/

27. (Cont'd.) 11, 1952); Appeal of Charles B. Gonsales, at 1
(January 23, 1953); and Secretarial Order, 36 Fed. Reg. 19920
(1971) (LD 210).
28. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 5010, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., at
1-2 (1906) (Letters of Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of
Indian Affairs); Presidential Proclamation dated September 1,
1906, 34 Stat. 3228; Letter of the Acting Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, dated September 26, 1907, at 1 (JX 336); Letter of the
First Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated November 8, 1907, at 1 (JX 338); H.R. Doc.
No. 1279, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2-3 (1909) (1908 Letters of
Secretary and Commissioner of Indian Affairs); Letter of the
Secretary of Interior, dated December 19, 1908, at 1, 2, 4 & 6
(JX 341); and 39 I.D. 79 (1910) (Acting Secretary of Interior).
See also 34 I.D. 549, 549-50 (1906) (Ass't. Attorney General).
29. See, e.g., 773 F.2d at 1105 (Seth J., dissenting); S.
Doc. No. 78, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1919) (Letter of the
Secretary of the Interior); 1929 Annual Report of the Uintah &
Ouray Agency, at 1 (JX 420); 1931 Agency Crazing Report, at 1, 3
(JX 424); 1931 Annual Agency Report, at 4 (JX 425); 1932 Annual
Agency Report, at 1 (JX 427); H.R. Rep. No. 370, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 3 (1941) (Report submitted by Secretary of Interior);
Phoenix Area Office, Information Profiles of Indian Reservations
in Arizona, Nevada t Utah, at 155 (1976) (JX 490).

Judicial pronouncements also follow suit.

In decisions ren-

dered prior to Ute Indian Tribe, the courts interpreted the 1905
Act as merely amending, not superseding, the 1902 Act.11/ Indeed, in 1946, the Tenth Circuit expressly held in Hanson v.
United States—a decision unaccountably ignored by the en banc
majority—that the unalloted and unreserved lands of the original
Uintah reservation vere "restored to the public domain by the Act
of May 27, 1902. . . ."

Id. at 163. The Utah Supreme Court

likewise recognized the restoration of the unallotted lands to
the public domain under these Acts.

Sovards, 108 P. at 1114.

Finally, in a different context, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that the Tribe's reservation vas considered to be only
i

those lands held in trust by the federal government.

Affiliated

Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 141 (1972).
Moreover, by holding that the original Uintah reservation
remains intact, the en banc majority has created vhat must be one
of the fev—if not the only—Indian reservations engulfing a national forest.

The district court and the panel of the court of

appeals agreed that such an anomaly vas not intended and that the
forest provisions of the Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1048,
1069*70, vhlch set aside more than 1 million acres "as an addition to the Uintah Forest reserve, subject to the lavs, rules and
regulations governing forest reserves," thereby diminished the

32. See Hanson v. United States, 153 F.2d at 162-63; Uintah
and White^Rlver Bands of Ute Indians, 139 Ct.Cl. at 5-6 ft 21-22;
United States v. Boss, 160 F. 132, 132-33 (D. Utah 1906); and
Sovards v. Meagher, 108 P. 1112, 1114 (Utah 1910).

amendments thereto, • • • allotments in severalty . . . . were
made to the Uintah and White River Indians, and surplus lands • .
• • yere restored to the public domain, and opened for disposition under the public land lavs for the benefit of the Indians"
(emphasis added).

What Is more, the United States (and the Utes)

consistently and repeatedly maintained that the original Uintah
reservation was a former reservation; and throughout its opinion
and findings, the Court of Claims also treated the original Uintah reservation as having ended.
56, 64, 69 and 70.

E.g., 139 Ct.Cl. at 2, 25, 28,

It is also worthy of note that when the Ute

Indian plaintiffs appeared in the Court of Claims, they summed it
up veil:

"Nov, the Act of May 27, 1902, comes as a matter of

particular importance in this suit because that is the Act as
amended under which the Uintah Reservation vas ultimately broken
up."22/
b.

Subsequent Demographic History Supports
Disestablishment
Here, the demographic history of the area demon-

strates that the en banc majority's decision will not materially
advance the interests of tribal sovereignty (which has for the
past 60 years been exercised primarily on the trust lands), but
will seriously hamper the functioning of State and local governments in a myriad of areas. The disputed area "lost its Indian
character" long ago.

It is "predominantly populated by non-

33. Opening statement in testimony for plaintiff, Uintah and
White River Band of Utes v, U.S., No. 47569, U.S. Court of Claims
at p. 195 (Jan. 11, 1954).

reservation area subsequent to the opening, except on the trust
lands.

The early jurisdictional history of the disputed area

shows that the Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Agency (the White
River, Uintah and Uncompahgre Utes) were, after the historic
reservation was opened to settlement, generally subject to the
laws of the State of Utah within those areas so opened (excluding
trust lands).21/

For example, in the Annual Report of the Super-

intendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency for 1916 (JX 380), it
was stated as follows:
The Indians of this Jurisdiction are citizens of
the State of Utah, and voters, and the present
Superintendent has not assumed any jurisdiction
over their persons. Where offences have been cornBitted against the laws of the State, the matter
has been reported to the County authorities and the
agency officials have endeavored to co-operate with
the County authorities in the maintenance of law
and order.
Id. at 2*3.

Other documentary evidence also demonstrates that

the State exercised jurisdiction within the historic reservation
area beginning in the early

1900'*.11/

The primary evidence regarding the more recent jurisdictional
history of the disputed area was the testimony of various State
and local officials introduced at the federal district court trial.

This testimony shows that until recently the State continued

95. See, e.g., JX 344; JX 354 at 2-3; JX 368 at 2-3; JX 380
at 2; JX 386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4; JX 396; JX 397 at 2; JX 399
at 2; JX 412 at 1; JX 415 at 1-3; JX 417 at 1-2; and JX 420.
36. See also letter from District Superintendent, Indian
Field Service, August 5, 1926 (JX 412); Annual Report of the
Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency, 1917 and 1918; JX
386 at 4-5; JX 393 at 3-4. See also Trial Tr. at 269 and 277-78
(testimony of Ceorge Karett, Sheriff of Duchesne County).

Further, for many decades the Ute Tribe has maintained signs
at the boundaries of the trust lands, advising the public that
they were entering the "Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation."
These signs were clearly intended to designate what the Tribe
thought were the reservation boundaries.

The signs have been

replaced from time to tine over the years (with the signs in more
recent times being more elaborate), but they have always indicated that the boundaries of the trust lands were the reservation
boundaries.12/
In short, the record is clear that until recent years the
Tribe never attempted to exert any significant jurisdictional
authority off the trust lands. The history of the area in dispute shows that it has long been the responsibility of State and
local governments, is overwhelmingly populated by non-Indians,
and has lost its Indian character virtually from the opening of
the reservation in 1905.
Applying the analytical test developed by the United States
Supreme Court to the legislation, facts and circumstances surrounding the opening of the original Uintah reservation, the conclusion Bust be that the reservation was disestablished and the
surplus lands which were restored to the public domain are not
part of the reservation--nor do they constitute Indian country as

40. See, for example, the testimonies of Dave Thomas (Tr.
155-57} and Cordon Karmston (Tr. 176-77). A series of photographs of such signs located at trust land boundaries, as such
signs appeared on March 22, 1977, were introduced at trial as Ex.
I-4B, coordinated with Ex. I-4A, indicating the precise locations
where the various photographs were taken.

